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Abstract
From 1988 to 1995, when trade liberalization was implemented in
Brazil, relative earnings of skilled workers decreased. In this paper, we in-
vestigate the role of trade liberalization in explaining these relative earn-
ings movements, by checking all the steps predicted by the Heckscher-
Ohlin-style trade transmission mechanism. We ﬁnd that: i) employment
shifted from skilled to unskilled intensive sectors, and each sector increased
its relative share of skilled labor; ii) relative prices fell in skill intensive
sectors; iii) tariﬀ changes across sectors were not related to skill inten-
sities, but the pass-through from tariﬀs to prices was stronger in skill
intensive sectors; iv) the decline in skilled earnings diﬀerentials mandated
by the price variation predicted by trade is very close to the observed one.
The results are compatible with trade liberalization, accounting for the
observed relative earnings changes in Brazil.
1 Introduction
In terms of income distribution, Brazil is one of the most unequal countries in
the world. In the Human Development Report (United Nations Development
Program, 2000), for example, Brazil tops the ranking of income concentration
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Moreira for help with price data; IBRE-FGV for providing domestic price data; Jorge Arbache,
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1for 86 countries in the world. The ratio between the mean income appropriated
by the richest 20% of families and by the poorest 20% is about 33 in Brazil,
compared, for example, to 8 in the U.S., 9 in the U.K., 14 in Russia, 4 in Sri
Lanka and Nepal, 18 in Kenya and 30 in Guatemala (the country with the second
highest ratio). Squire and Zou (1998) also present data on Gini coeﬃcients for
several countries, which show Brazil on the top of the list with an average (over
time) coeﬃcient of 0.578 relative to a sample mean (s.d.) of 0.362 (0.092).
T h el e v e la n dd i s p e r s i o no fw a g e si nac o u n t r ya tap o i n ti nt i m ei ng e n e r a l
depend on the distribution of its workers’ characteristics, such as education,
eﬀort, experience, other observed and unobserved skills, and on the returns to
these attributes. These returns, in turn, depend on the demand distribution for
these characteristics. Institutional factors, such as trade unions and minimum
wages, may also aﬀect the wage structure. In Brazil, as well as in other less
developed countries, education is often seen as the main source of inequality.
Barros et al (2000), for example, show that the distribution of education and its
returns account for about half of the wage inequality from observed sources in
Brazil. This occurs because education is very unequally distributed and because
returns to education are quite high in Brazil.1
Although income inequality has not changed much over the past ﬁfteen years,
education earnings diﬀerentials fell during the trade liberalization period. Brazil
carried out a massive trade liberalization from 1988 to 1995. Non-tariﬀ barriers
were ﬁrst gradually substituted by tariﬀs ,a n dt h e nt a r i ﬀs were reduced from
an average of 39.6% in 1988 to 13.1% in 1995. Earnings of workers with at
least high school diplomas were 3.85 times higher than those for less educated
workers in 1988, and this ratio decreased to 3.28 in 1995.
This paper investigates the role of trade liberalization in explaining these rel-
1Menezes-Filho et al. (2001) compare 17 countries from Latin America and the Caribbean
to ﬁnd that returns to education are highest in Brazil. Lam and Levinson (1987) ﬁnd that
r e t u r n st oe d u c a t i o na r em u c hh i g h e ri nB r a z i lt h a ni nt h eU . S .
2ative earnings movements, through a Heckscher-Ohlin-style mechanism. This is
accomplished by performing several independent empirical exercises, including
consistency checks on the causality path predicted by trade theory, using dis-
aggregated data on tariﬀs, prices, wages, employment and skill intensity from
1988 to 1995. We produce evidence showing that trade liberalization played a
major role in accounting for the reduction of education earnings diﬀerentials in
Brazil between 1988 and 1995.
Brazil is particularly well suited for studying the eﬀects of trade on earn-
ings inequality. First, Brazil moved from being a very protected economy to
an open one in a relatively short period of time. Second, relative prices have
displayed substantial variation over this period, mostly due to very high inﬂa-
tion rates (the average monthly inﬂation rate for the 1988-95 period was 20,7%).
This is important because Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects work through relative prices
changes. Finally, Brazil has very high-quality and relatively unexplored estab-
lishment and household data sets.
There is a wide empirical literature studying the contribution of international
trade to the rising skill premium in the U.S. and U.K., given the considerable
increase in trade over the past decades. Most of this literature is based on
the Heckscher-Ohlin model (see, for example, Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993,
and Leamer, 1996)), but a competing view attempts to associate the rising skill
premium to skill biased technological changes (see, for example, Berman, Bound
and Griliches, 1994, and Katz and Autor, 1999). Although some papers have
been successful in relating relative product prices changes to relative wages, most
of the available evidence favors the skill biased technological change explanation
(see Slaughter, 1998, for a survey of product-price studies using U.S. data).
With respect to less developed countries, the literature is far scantier (see
Slaughter, 2000, for a survey on the eﬀects of trade liberalization on labor
markets in developing countries). Studies on Mexico and Chile show that these
3countries have also experienced increases in wage diﬀerentials, despite having
opened their economies to trade. Hanson and Harrison (1999) argue that trade
protection was skewed towards low-skilled workers in Mexico prior to the reform,
so that the tariﬀs decline was deeper in those sectors, which could have led to
the increase in wage diﬀerentials observed in this country. However, the authors
did not ﬁnd any correlation between price changes and skill intensity. Robertson
(2001) shows that, following Mexico’s entrance to the GATT, the relative price
of skill-intensive goods rose and so did the relative wages of skilled workers.
However, following the creation of NAFTA, the opposite took place. Beyer et
al.(1999) ﬁnd that a fall in the relative price of labor intensive goods in Chile
helps to explain the simultaneous rise in wage inequality. This led Berman
et al (1998) to argue that skill biased technological change was pervasive in
developing countries as well.
All studies on developing countries identify an increase in earnings inequal-
ity. This contrasts with the evidence for Brazil, where a decrease in earnings
diﬀerentials was observed. Moreover, there are no studies exploring the Stolper-
Samuelson eﬀects of trade on skilled earnings diﬀerentials through relative prices
in Brazil (see Arbache, 2001, for a survey on the eﬀects of trade liberalization
on the Brazilian labor market).
A possible problem with the studies for other developing countries is the
u s eo ft h es h a r eo fn o n - p r o d u c t i o nw o r k e r sa sap r o x yf o rs k i l li n t e n s i t y .A sw e
argue in Section 2, we consider education attainment a more adequate measure
of skill. Krueger (1997) uses both education and non-production share measures
of skill intensity for U.S. data, where both measures are available, and obtains
qualitatively the same results. Slaughter (1998) shows that the results of studies
that use either measure are comparable. This paper shows that this is not the
case for Brazil. When education attainment is used to measure skill intensity,
we ﬁnd a reduction in earnings inequality, while a slight increase is observed
4for the nonproduction measure. We show that both movements are compatible
with traditional trade theory. This should be taken as a warning for how to
interpret the results of studies for other developing countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and some
stylized facts. The Brazilian trade liberalization process is brieﬂy described
in Section 3. Section 4 presents the various empirical exercises linking trade
liberalization to earnings diﬀerentials and Section 5 concludes.
2D a t a a n d S t y l i z e d F a c t s
We put together data from several diﬀerent sources. For the education and
earnings data we use a particularly rich data set, consisting of repeated cross-
sections of an annual household survey (Pesquisa Nacional de Amostras por
Domic´ ilio - PNAD), conducted each September by the Brazilian Census Bureau
(IBGE) and used in several studies about the Brazilian labor market (see Lam
and Shoeni, 1989, for example). Each cross-section is a representative sample of
the Brazilian population and contains about 100,000 observations on households,
from which around 330,000 individuals are interviewed.
From the original data, we kept only individuals with positive hours worked
in the reference week and with positive monetary remuneration. The main
variable used in this analysis is real hourly earnings, deﬁned as the normal
labor income in the main job in the reference month, normalized by normal
weekly working hours. The sample also includes self-employed and workers
with informal contracts. We measure education by completed years of formal
schooling.
We split individuals into two education groups: the skilled (those that have
at least completed high school, that is, 11 years of education) and the unskilled
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Figure 1: Education Earnings Diﬀerentials
than 10% of the workforce had completed college education over the period
studied, which is clearly too small a fraction of the labor force, compared with
more than 20% of workers with complete high school. Therefore, we choose to
use the high school deﬁnition in all empirical exercises that follow.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of earnings diﬀerentials between skilled and
unskilled workers in Brazil between 1981 and 1997. The dotted line uses our
preferred measure of skill (high school or more) and refers to the manufacturing
sector only. It shows that wage diﬀerentials remained basically constant between
1981 and 1988, dropping continuously afterwards. It is important to note that
trade liberalization started in 1988. The continuous line with triangles shows
that the behavior for the economy as a whole followed a similar path, which is to
be expected, as workers can move between sectors. Finally, the line with squares
shows what happens if we use college education to deﬁne a skilled worker. The
drop in earnings diﬀerentials can still be noted in this case, but it is smaller in
6magnitude and concentrated in the 1988-1992 period2.
A sw em e n t i o n e di nt h ei n t r o d u c t i o n , all studies that investigated the eﬀects
of trade liberalization in developing countries used the share of non-production
workers as a proxy for skill intensity. In order to compare our results with
those using this alternative deﬁnition, we used data on occupation from the
Brazilian Industrial Surveys (Pesquisa Industrial Anual-PIA), also collected by
the Brazilian Census Bureau over the same time period, and matched them
to the education deﬁnitions described above. As the sectors in the industrial
surveys are deﬁned at a more disaggregated level than in the household surveys,
we would obtain eﬃciency gains by using the non-production deﬁnition of skill
if the results using the two deﬁnitions of skill were compatible.
Figures 2 and 3 show that, while there is a strong association between the
high education and the non-production employment share across the manufac-
turing sectors, the correlation between the skill earnings diﬀerentials computed
using the two deﬁnitions is much weaker. More importantly, Figure 4 shows
that the earnings diﬀerentials computed using non-production occupation as a
proxy for skill actually rose slightly along the sample period. This behavior
contrasts with the fall of relative earnings observed when education attainment
is used as a proxy for skill. Obviously, neither measure perfectly reﬂects skill
intensity, which is unobservable to the econometrician. Education attainment
fails to reﬂect skill intensity when, for instance, a highly educated worker is per-
forming a task that does not require skill. On the other hand, some blue-collar
workers can have highly skill demanding assignments. Nonetheless, we believe
that education attainment is a more accurate proxy for skill. Based on these
considerations, we use education to construct our skill composition measure in
the empirical exercises that follow, but also report results of experiments using
2It is important to note that the wage diﬀerential between college educated and high school
educated workers rose over the 1990s in Brazil, but this was outweighted in our sample by the

























































Figure 2: Education and Ocupation Employment Shares
the occupation measure.
The drop in skilled-labor relative earnings observed in Figure 1 could have
been caused solely by a rise in skilled labor relative supply. Figure 5 indeed
shows that there was a rise in the share of skilled workers over the same time
p e r i o d ,b o t hi nt h em a n u f a c t u r i n gs e c t o r (line with triangles) and in the econ-
omy as a whole (dotted line). The line that uses the college deﬁnition of skill
(continuous with squares) also trended upwards, but at a slower pace. Note
that, according to the college deﬁnition, only about 9% of the workforce was
skilled in 1988-1995.
While labor supply could have a say in the decline of wage diﬀerentials
observed above, it is worth noting that the relative supply of skilled workers
rose steadily over the period, with minor ﬂuctuations. By contrast, Figure 1
shows that wage diﬀerentials remained basically stable until 1988, starting to
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Figure 5: Education Relative Labor Supply
that other factors are behind the behavior of wage diﬀerentials. We now try to
uncover these factors.
3 Theoretical Considerations
In traditional trade models, international trade is based on diﬀerences among
countries, which may be either in their factor endowments, as in the Heckscher-
Ohlin framework, or in the technology they possess, as in Ricardian models.
A common feature in these models is that, in a small open economy, relative
wages are a function only of technological parameters and relative prices. The
intuition for this result is the following. In a small open economy, relative prices
of tradable goods are determined abroad, and any excess supply or demand is
fulﬁlled by trade of goods. Wages, in turn, are equal to the value of the fac-
tors’ marginal productivity. As prices are exogenous, and marginal productivity
depends solely on technological parameters, wages will depend only on prices
10and technological parameters, and not on factors’ supply or goods’ demand
parameters.3
The crucial point in these models is that the eﬀect of trade liberalization
on relative wages happens through its eﬀect on relative domestic prices. In the
small country case, domestic prices are distorted by trade constraints, so that:
Pi =( 1+ti)
αi EP∗
i ,( 1 )
where Pi represents the domestic price for good i; ti is the import tariﬀ or the
export subsidy (or more generally, any type of rents generated by other trade
barriers, like quantitative restrictions); E is the nominal exchange rate; and P∗
i
i st h ei n t e r n a t i o n a lp r i c eo fg o o di. The parameter αi captures the pass-through
from tariﬀs to domestic prices. In a H-O world, economies’ trade is completely
specialized, that is, countries should import only goods in which they do not
have comparative advantage. In such a world, import tariﬀs’ pass-through to
prices, αi, should be equal to one in the importing sectors and zero in the
exporting ones. There is no such complete specialization in the real world, as
not only H-O forces are in play. Hence, there will be imports and exports in all
sectors. However, the sector in which the country has no comparative advantage
should present a higher pass-through from tariﬀs to prices.











Equation (2) shows that a fall in trade barriers across sectors may cause
changes in relative prices. This depends on the change in relative tariﬀsa n d
3More precisely, if the economy is in the cone of diversiﬁcation and the number of goods is
greater or equal to the number of factors, then factor relative prices depend only on relative
prices of tradable goods being produced, and technological parameters. If the economy is
outside the diversiﬁcation cone, or the number of goods is smaller than the number of factors,
then relative factor prices will depend not only on technology and relative prices of goods being
produced, but also on taste parameters and factor supplies. The existence of non-tradable
goods does not alter the main implications of the analysis. The only eﬀect of non-tradables
is to decrease the size of the diversiﬁcation cone.
11on the pass-through coeﬃcients. If the pass-through is the same for all sectors,
trade liberalization aﬀects relative prices only if tariﬀ reductions are heteroge-
neous across sectors. However, even a homogeneous tariﬀs decrease may lead
to relative price changes, which happens when pass-through coeﬃcients are dif-
ferent.
If falling tariﬀs had a larger impact on prices of sectors that use skilled
labor more intensively, the new price incentives would then induce a shift of
production from skill- towards non-skill-intensive sectors, increasing the demand
for unskilled labor and decreasing that for skilled labor. In this case, for a given
labor supply, relative skilled-labor wages would decline in order to restore labor
market equilibrium.
The new relative wages, in turn, would induce producers to decrease the
use of the production factor that became relatively more expensive. Hence,
producers in each sector would change the mix of factors, using more skilled
and less unskilled labor relative to the pre-liberalization choice. This last eﬀect
would oﬀset the original relative demand increase for unskilled labor. In the
end, one should observe higher relative wages for unskilled labor, an increase
in employment and production in unskilled-intensive sectors, and an increase
in the use of skilled labor in all sectors. The empirical section of this paper,
Section 5, investigates whether the comovements of sectorial variables following
Brazilian trade liberalization conform to this trade transmission mechanism.
4 Trade Liberalization in Brazil
In this section we brieﬂy describe the process of trade liberalization in Brazil.
Brazil has a long tradition of restrictive trade policies. From World War II to
1973 the country pursued an import substitution strategy, following the trend
among Latin American countries. This strategy was based on domestic mar-
12ket protection and subsidies to chosen industries. From 1960 to 1973 there
was a gradual import liberalization, combined with export promotion policies,
including frequent exchange rate devaluations. As a result of these policies,
Brazilian exports became considerably more diversiﬁed. For example, coﬀee
exports, which accounted for 40% of total exports in 1964, fell to only 20% in
1973. The impact on imports was not as signiﬁcant. There was some import
substitution in intermediate and capital goods, but imports remained highly
concentrated in those goods, as well as in oil, which accounted for 20% of total
imports in 1974.
The two oil crises of the 1970s brought about large trade imbalances. The
Brazilian government chose to use restrictive trade policy instead of letting
exchange rate devaluations restore trade balance. Tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers
were imposed, along with export promotion policies to compensate for the anti-
export bias generated by the import restrictions. The debt crisis of the 1980s
called for large trade surpluses, which were attained by the intensiﬁcation of
trade restrictions and an industrial policy that gave ﬁscal incentives and cheap
credit to selected ﬁrms.
In sum, trade barriers were built over several decades, but responding to dif-
ferent policy orientations. Trade policy before 1974 was designed as an incentive
to selected sectors as part of the import substitution strategy. After 1974, the
increase in both tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers was a reaction to macroeconomic
instability caused by the oil shocks and the debt crisis. The eﬀect of these poli-
cies on relative prices distorted microeconomic incentives. By the end of the
1980’s a maze of policy incentives was in place.
An important question for our pu r p o s e si sw h e t h e rt h et a r i ﬀ structure fa-
vored skill-intensive sectors. In order to answer this question, we use data on
tariﬀs for 60 sectors between 1988 and 1995, from Kume et al (2002). Figure








































Figure 6: Tariﬀs and Skill Proportion
relation with skill-intensity (using education as a measure of skill). This comes
as no surprise, given that trade barriers were raised to cope with macroeco-
nomic problems, and not to protect sectors in which Brazil had no comparative
advantage.
The trade liberalization process was initiated in 1988 and intensiﬁed by a new
government in 1990, in conjunction with the implementation of a regional trade
block, Mercosul.4 Trade liberalization was even deeper than planned. However,
after the 1994 Mexican crisis, there was a partial reversal of the process. Some
quantitative import restrictions were temporarily re-introduced, and some tariﬀs
were raised. Nonetheless, the average tariﬀ level was below 14% by November
1995. The bulk of trade liberalization occurred from 1988 to 1995, with minor
tariﬀ changes since then. Table 1 shows the evolution of nominal and eﬀective
tariﬀs from 1988 to 1995.
4The Mercosul agreement established a customs union between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay
and Paraguay.
14Nominal tariﬀs 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Simple average 39.6 32.1 30.5 23.6 15.7 13.5 11.2 13.1
Weighted average* 37.7 29.4 27.2 20.9 14.1 12.5 10.2 12.2
Standard deviation 14.6 15.8 14.9 12.7 8.2 6.7 5.9 8.6
Eﬀective tariﬀs 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Simple average 52.1 46.5 47.7 34.8 20.3 16.7 13.6 20.1
Weighted average* 46.8 38.8 37.0 28.6 17.7 15.2 12.3 15.6
Standard deviation 36.6 44.5 60.6 36.5 17.2 13.5 8.4 37.2
(*) Weighted by value added.
Table 1: Nominal and eﬀective tariﬀs, 1988-1995
Figure 7 shows that tariﬀs seem to have declined slightly more in the more
skill-intensive sectors, although not dramatically so, a pattern that will be fur-
ther investigated below. This contrasts sharply with what was observed in
Mexico. Hanson and Harrison (1999) and Robertson (2001), for example, show
that Mexican tariﬀs were relatively lower in skill-intensive sectors before trade
liberalization, and decreased less in those sectors.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Within and Between Industry Decomposition
Our empirical exercise begins by investigating whether trade liberalization is
t h em a i nr e a s o nf o rt h ed r o pi ns k i l le a r n i n g sd i ﬀerentials observed in Brazil or
whether the increase in skilled labor supply alone can explain it. As discussed
below, these two possible explanations have diﬀerent implications for the re-
sults of standard decompositions of skilled-labor relative employment and wage
bill shares into within and between industry change (see Berman, Bound and
Griliches, 1994 and Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998).






) may be decom-






































































Figure 7: Changes in Tariﬀs and Skill Proportion
which are interpreted as:
1. within industry changes, which are changes in skilled-labor employment










2. between industry changes, which are changes in each industry employment








What would be the results of this decomposition exercise if the increase in
relative labor supply were the only signiﬁcant change in the economy? According
to the Rybczynski theorem, for a small open economy, an increase in a factor
endowment raises the output of sectors that use that factor intensively, and
decreases other sectors’ output, without changing the factor proportion used
in each industry. In terms of equation 3, an increase in skilled-labor supply is
16represented by a positive left hand side. Since factor proportions do not change
in each industry, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side, which represents the
within industry eﬀect, should be zero. The whole eﬀect should lie in the second
term - the between industry eﬀect- which should be positive.
W h a tw o u l db et h er e s u l t so ft h i se x e r c i s ei ft r a d ew e r et h eo n l ys o u r c e
behind the changes in wage inequality? As described in Section 3, trade should
have caused a decrease in relative prices of skill-intensive sectors in order to
produce the observed decrease in wage inequality. On the one hand, these
price incentives would decrease production in those sectors, which denote a
negative between industry eﬀect. On the other hand, the relative wage incentives
would shift labor demand towards skilled workers within each industry, that is,
a positive within industry eﬀect. With given factor supplies, the two eﬀects
should oﬀset each other. It is important to note, however, that skill biased
technological change would also cause a positive within industry eﬀect. The
two eﬀects would reinforce each other here, as opposed to the case in developed
countries.
Table 2 presents the decomposition results for skilled-labor employment and
wage bill shares, using education attainment as a measure of skill. Conﬁrming
the labor supply movements displayed in Figure 5, skilled-labor employment
share increased 2.67% a year between 1988 and 1995, on average. The de-
composition reveals that the within eﬀect is positive and the between eﬀect is
negative. Two important conclusions emerge: (1) labor supply changes alone
cannot account for these results, and (2) the results are compatible with the
trade explanation.5
Table 2 also shows that the wage bill share of skilled workers increased over
5Results not reported here, using non-production share as a proxy for skill, are also com-
patible with trade. But in this case, they explain the increase in earnings diﬀerentals observed
for that skill measure. There was an average overall annual decrease of 0.7% in non-production
employment share. This was decomposed into a negative within industry eﬀect (-1.4%), which
outweighted a positive between industry eﬀect (0.7%).
17Total Within Sectors Between Sectors
High Education 0.0267 0.0334 -0.0067
Employment Share (100%) (125%) (-25%)
High Education 0.0084 0.0256 -0.0172
Wage Bill Share (100%) (304%) (-204%)
Table 2: Employment and Wage Bill Shares Decompositions, 1988-95
the period. However, it increased on average less than the employment share,
0.84% by year. This is compatible with the observed decrease in skilled labor
relative wages. Consequently, the skilled worker wage bill share between sector
eﬀect is larger compared to that of employment share. The employment share
decomposition presents a negative between eﬀect, which means that, on average,
employment share decreased in industries that use skilled labor more intensively.
As these sectors use more of the factor that had its remuneration decreased, it is
logical that their overall wage bill share should decrease by a larger proportion
than the employment share.
5.2 Consistency Checks
In this sub-section, consistency checks examine the causality path predicted by
trade theory. As discussed in Section 3, the following relationships should be
investigated to determine whether trade liberalization was responsible for the
decrease in skilled labor relative earnings observed in Brazil:
1. What was the pattern of relative price changes? To be consistent with the
decrease in earnings inequality, one should observe a decrease in the rela-
tive prices of the sectors that use skilled labor intensively. This should be
reﬂected in the data through a negative correlation between price changes
and skill intensity.
2. Was the pattern of price changes caused by tariﬀ changes? This can be
examined through the estimation of price equations based on the rela-
18tionship established in equation (1). If the changes in relative prices in
skill-intensive sectors were induced by trade liberalization, one should ei-
ther observe that the largest tariﬀ reductions occurred in the most skill-
intensive sectors or that the eﬀect of tariﬀso np r i c e sw a sl a r g e ri nt h e s e
sectors.
5.2.1 Prices, Tariﬀs and Skill Intensity
The ﬁrst step is to check whether the pattern of price changes is consistent with
the observed decrease in skilled labor relative wages. We start by estimating
the following equation:






+ νiτ,( 4 )
where Piτ is the wholesale price for sector i in year τ. The pattern of price
changes must deliver a negative value for β1, in order to be consistent with
the decrease in skilled-labor relative earnings. Before turning to the estimated
equations, Figure 8 shows that, between 1988 and 1995, prices rose less in sectors
with a higher proportion of educated workers.
Equation (4) is estimated using a panel of yearly observations from 1988
to 1995, for a sample of 60 sectors, deﬁned according to the Brazilian Indus-
trial Surveys (PIA). The Brazilian wholesale price index (´ Indice de Pre¸ cos por
Atacado, IPA) was collected by the Getulio Vargas Foundation and was made
compatible with the PIA sectorial deﬁnitions. We correct the standard errors
of all coeﬃcients here and in the following sub-section for the fact that our
independent variable (share of educated workers) is more aggregated than the
dependent variables we use.
The results of estimating equation (4), with annual data and controlling
for time eﬀects, are presented in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 3. A signiﬁ-




















































Figure 8: Price Changes and Skill Proportion
showing that relative prices changed in favor of less skill-intensive sectors. In
the second column, we include the share of non-production workers as an addi-
tional control, which attracts a negative coeﬃcient and signiﬁcantly raises the
estimated education share coeﬃcient. This suggests that the two skill measures
are positively correlated with each other, but relative prices moved in opposite
directions with respect to them, so that the exclusion of one measure biases the
coeﬃc i e n to ft h eo t h e r . I nt h et h i r dc o l u m n ,w ed on o tu s et h ee m p l o y m e n t
weights, with no observed qualitative change in the results. Therefore, relative
price changes are consistent with the observed change in earnings diﬀerentials.
According to our story, the Heckscher-Ohlin trade transmission mechanism
is triggered by a reduction in trade barriers that have diﬀerent impact across
sectors. This could be the result of either a sharper reduction in tariﬀsi nm o r e
skill-intensive sectors or a larger impact on prices of the tariﬀs reduction in these
sectors. We investigate the ﬁrst possibility here, while the second is examined
20in the next sub-section.
We estimate the correlation between tariﬀ changes and skill intensity using
the following equation:






+ ηiτ,( 5 )






is the share of skilled labor
employed in sector i.
The results are presented in columns (3) to (6) in Table 4. Neither skill inten-
sity measures are signiﬁcantly correlated with the changes in tariﬀs. Therefore,
as suggested by Figure 7, there is no clear pattern of tariﬀ reductions with
relation to skill intensity in Brazil.
Dependent Variable
Change in Prices Change in Tariﬀs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education -0.043 -0.070 -0.053 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
Employment Share (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Non-production - 0.058 0.040 - -0.001 0.002
Employment Share (0.023) (0.018) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 3.489 3.520 0.623 -0.026 -0.027 0.012
(0.039) (0.038) (0.035) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006)
N 420 420 420 420 420 420
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Weighted Regression yes yes no yes yes no
Notes: Weights are the sector employment shares. Robust standard errors are in parentheses
Table 3: Tariﬀs and Skill Intensity, 1988-95
5.2.2 Prices and tariﬀs
From equation (1), domestic prices changes are related to changes in trade
barriers and international prices as follows:
21∆logPiτ = αi∆log(1 + tiτ)+∆logE + ∆logP∗
iτ.( 6 )
Since the nominal exchange rate is the same for every sector, and data
on rents generated by other trade barriers is unavailable, the equation to be
estimated takes the following form:
∆logPiτ = δ0 + δ1αi∆log(1 + Tiτ)+δ2∆logP∗
iτ + εi (7)
where Ti is the import tariﬀ for sector i, and U.S. prices are used as a proxy for
international prices P∗
i . Changes in the nominal exchange rate are a component
of the constant term, δ0; whereas changes in the rents generated by other trade
barriers are captured by the error term, εi. The expected values for parameters
δ1 and δ2 are 1. Remember that αi is the pass-through coeﬃcient from tariﬀs
to prices in sector i. We start by imposing that the pass-through coeﬃcient be
equal in all sectors (αi = α, ∀i), that is, we estimate the coeﬃcient δ1α.
Equation (7) is estimated using a panel of yearly observations from 1988 to
1995, for the same sample of 60 sectors. U.S. producer price data were drawn
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Website. We could only match 50 U.S.
sectors to the equivalent Brazilian sectors.
The ﬁrst column of Table 4 presents the estimation results when changes in
tariﬀs and in U.S. prices are used as explanatory variables for price changes in
Brazil. The estimated tariﬀ coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at conventional statistical levels. However, the coeﬃcient for U.S. prices
is not precisely estimated. This might indicate that U.S. prices are a poor
proxy for international prices. Therefore, in column (2) we drop U.S. prices to
gain eﬃciency, but the results do not change qualitatively. Finally, in the third
column we use an unweighted regression and show that the results are robust to
22the use of weights. These results conﬁrm that sectorial prices and tariﬀsm o v e d
together for the period as a whole.
Dependent Variable: Change in Prices
(1) (2) (3)
Change in Tariﬀs 0.457 0.478 0.415
(0.237) (0.233) (0.218)
Change in US Prices 0.105 - -
(0.182)
Constant 2.882 2.315 0.646
(0.018) (0.023) (0.015)
N 350 420 420
Time Dummies yes yes yes
Weighted Regression yes yes no
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Weights are the sector employment shares.
Table 4: Prices and Tariﬀs, 1988-95
There is one caveat in interpreting the results of this regression. Equation
(1) refers to goods prices, and in the empirical estimation we use sectorial prices.
The composition of goods within each sector may change over time, and this
change may be correlated with changes in trade policy. On the one hand, trade
l i b e r a l i z a t i o nm a yr e d u c eo re v e ne l i m i n a t ed o m e s t i cp r o d u c t i o no fg o o d sw i t h
relatively high domestic production costs. On the other hand, new products may
be introduced due to the reduced cost of imported goods. Even though this is a
drawback, there is nothing we can do to correct for possible measurement errors
caused by it.
W en o wa l l o wf o rad i ﬀerent pass-through coeﬃcient across sectors. As
discussed above, although tariﬀ changes and skill intensity showed no signiﬁcant
correlation, it is still possible that relative price changes, which were consistent
with the relative wages changes, were caused by trade. This would be true if
23sectors have diﬀerent tariﬀ pass-through coeﬃcients, in such a way that the tariﬀ
reduction, albeit uniform across sectors, produced diﬀerentiated price responses.
In particular, the observed relative price changes could have been caused by the
trade liberalization if the pass-through coeﬃcient from tariﬀs to prices were
higher in skill intensive sectors.
We therefore split the sectors in two groups according to their share of ed-
ucated workers: those with shares above the median in 1988 and those with
shares below the median. We then interacted the changes in tariﬀsw i t ht h e s e
group indicators. The results are presented in Table 5. In column 1, where we
include U.S. prices as an additional control, we can note that that coeﬃcient of
the change in tariﬀs is almost one and a half times higher in the high education
sectors. This result is maintained if we drop U.S. prices, as column (2) shows.
More importantly, if we do not use the employment weights in the regression,
the diﬀerence in the pass-through coeﬃcients increases substantially, to almost
5 times. We feel these results provide evidence in favor of the diﬀerent tariﬀ
pass-through coeﬃcient hypothesis.
5.3 Mandated Wage Equations
While the pattern of price changes is consistent with the pattern of relative earn-
ings evolution, and seems to be determined by tariﬀ changes, we have not as yet
examined how much of the drop in skill earnings diﬀerentials could be attributed
to price changes. We therefore follow another vein of the trade literature (see
Baldwin and Cain, 1997, Haskel and Slaughter, 2002, and Robertson, 2001) and
estimate mandated wage equations. According to the Stolper-Samuelson the-
orem, price changes should equal factor price changes, weighted by the factor
cost share. If the only factors of production used were skilled and unskilled
24Dependent Variable: Change in Prices
(1) (2) (3)
Change in tariﬀs * 0.393 0.402 0.164
Low Education Share Indicator (0.271) (0.269) (0.261)
Change in tariﬀs * 0.591 0.635 0.783
High Education Share Indicator (0.311) (0.303) (0.265)
Change in US prices 0.115 - -
(0.184)
Constant 2.882 2.315 0.646
(0.018) (0.024) (0.015)
N 350 420 420
Time Dummies yes yes yes
Weighted Regression yes yes no
Notes: Weights are the sector employment shares.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 5: Prices and Tariﬀs by Skill Intensity, 1988-95








+ ∆logwU,( 8 )
where θ
S
j is the cost of skilled labor and θj is the total cost in sector j. Therefore,
regressing price changes on skilled labor cost share should yield an estimate of
the economy-wide returns to skill changes.
Our estimation is based on the following regression:






+ ηj,( 9 )
where the estimated coeﬃcient φ1 is interpreted as the changes in skill earnings
diﬀerentials associated with price changes.6






















25S i n c ew ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nt h ee ﬀect of prices that resulted from trade liber-
alization, we follow Haskel and Slaughter (2002) and estimate the equation (9)
in two steps. First, we estimate the change in prices predicted by the change in
tariﬀs. For this step, we compute two alternative sets of predicted prices: those
that result from the estimation of equation (7), presented in Table 4, and those
that result from allowing diﬀerent pass-through coeﬃcients according to sector
skill intensity, presented in Table 5. In the second step, we estimate equation (9)
using the predicted prices, instead of actual prices, as the dependent variable.
In this case, the estimated coeﬃcient φ1 is interpreted as the changes in returns
to skill that are mandated by price changes induced by trade liberalization.
Dependent Variable: Change in Prices
Predicted Predicted by tariﬀs,
by tariﬀsd i ﬀ.p a s s - t h r o u g h
(2) (3)




Auxiliary Regression Table 3 (2) Table 4 (3)
Actual Change in Wage Diﬀs -0.024 -0.024
N 420 420
Time Dummies yes yes
Notes: Weights used in the ﬁrst three columns are the sector employment shares.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 6: Mandated Wages
The results are presented in Table 6. The actual annualized fall in skill
earnings diﬀerentials observed in Brazil was 2.4% on average. The ﬁrst column
shows that the decline in earnings diﬀerentials mandated by the price variation







,w h i c hw o u l db ew e l le s t i m a t e di ft h es h a r eo fl a b o ri nt o -
tal cost is time invariant. An analogous argument applies for the constant term in equation
(9).
26predicted by the change in tariﬀs was estimated at 0.7%, but was not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero. However, when we use the price changes predicted
by tariﬀs, allowing for diﬀerent pass-through coeﬃcients (column 2), we ﬁnd a
mandated annualized skill earnings diﬀerential decline of 2.9%, which is very
close to the observed one.7 This result provides compelling evidence that trade
liberalization played a major role in explaining the decrease in skilled labor
relative earnings in Brazil.
6 Conclusion
During the trade liberalization implemented in Brazil from 1988 to 1995, earn-
ings of workers with at least complete high school decreased with respect to
earnings of less educated workers. In this paper we present evidence compat-
ible with trade liberalization having played a role in explaining these relative
earnings movements.
According to traditional trade theory, the mechanism through which trade
liberalization could have caused the observed reduction in relative earnings of
skilled workers in Brazil is the following. Trade liberalization should have de-
creased the relative prices of skill-intensive sectors, shifting production from
these to unskill-intensive sectors. This should have caused a relative decrease
in skilled labor demand, implying a fall in the relative wages of skilled labor .
The new factor price incentives, in turn, would have induced ﬁrms in all sectors
to increase the proportion of skilled labor used in production.
We perform several independent empirical exercises that check this trade
transmission mechanism, using disaggregated data on tariﬀs, prices, wages, em-
ployment and skill intensity from 1988 to 1995. First, a decomposition analysis
of changes in skilled-labor employment share over this period reveals a positive
7The use of non-weighted regressions, not reported here, results in a coeﬃcient of -5.9%,
with a standard error of 0.007.
27within industry eﬀect and a negative between industry eﬀect. This means that
employment shifted from skilled to unskilled intensive sectors, and that each
sector increased its relative share of skilled labor.
Second, a panel regression of prices on skill intensities delivers a negative
coeﬃcient, which implies that relative prices indeed fell in skill intensive sectors.
Although tariﬀ changes across sectors were not related to skill intensities, we
ﬁnd that the pass-through from tariﬀs to prices was stronger in skill intensive
sectors. This is consistent with trade liberalization being responsible for the
relative fall in prices of skill intensive sectors.
Finally, we apply a mandated wage equation analysis. We show that the
decline in skilled earnings diﬀerentials mandated by the price variation predicted
by trade is very close to the observed one. The predicted price variation was
obtained by regressing price changes on tariﬀ changes, allowing for diﬀerent
pass-through coeﬃcients.
In sum, all steps of the trade transmission mechanism were tested, and
the results are compatible with trade liberalization accounting for the observed
relative earnings changes in Brazil.
The results described above are obtained when we use education attainment
as a proxy for skill. Most of the literature for developing countries uses the
share of non-production workers instead. We show that one obtains opposite
results when this alternative measure is used for Brazil: non-production workers
relative earnings increased over the period. We also present some results which
are consistent with the trade transmission mechanism explaining the increased
diﬀerential for this other measure. This should be taken as a warning for studies
on countries that do not have an education attainment measure, and have to
use the non-production measure as a proxy for skill.
An issue that requires further investigation is the reason behind diﬀerent
pass-through coeﬃcients from tariﬀs to prices. We found that the impact of
28tariﬀs on prices was stronger in skill intensive sectors. We argue that this could
be due to Brazil having a comparative advantage in producing goods that use
unskilled workers intensively, which would imply that the change in tariﬀsi n
these sectors would have no important eﬀect on prices.
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